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Abstract
The paper introduces FTAPE (Fault Tolerance
And Performance Evaiuator), a tool that can be
used to compare fault-tolerant computers. The tool
combines system-wide fault injection with a control-
lable workload. A workload generator is used to cre-
ate high stress conditions for the machine. Faults
are injected based on this workload activity in or-
der to ensure a high level of fault propagation. The
errors/fault ratio and performance degradation are
presented as measures of fault tolerance.
1 Introduction
A method with which the fault tolerance of any com-
puter can be measured is desirable. Such a fault
tolerance measure can be used to compare fault-
tolerant computers. For purchasers of a new fault-
tolerant system, a measure that summarizes the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of the fault tolerance would
be a helpful aid. A fault tolerance measure can also
be used as feedback to engineers in the evaluation of
different fault-tolerant designs.
This paper introduces FTAPE (Fault Tolerance
and Performance Evaluator), a tool that character-
izes the fault tolerance of a computer with a single
measure. The tool combines a fault injector with a
workload generator to encourage a high level of fault
propagation, which is needed to thoroughly test the
fault tolerance mechanism of the system. The fault
injector measures the instantaneous workload activ-
ity to automatically determine the injection time
and location that will maximize fault propagation.
Since the fault detection and recovery mechanisms
that comprise the fault tolerance of a computer can
only be activated by faults and their correspond-
ing manifestations, fault injection is the most prac-
tical means to measure their effectiveness. FTAPE
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has the ability to inject faults into CPU registers,
memory, and disk systems. Because fault tolerance
mechanisms are present in many different parts of
a fault-tolerant system, faults must be injected into
those different parts in order to measure how well
the entire system responds to faults.
A synthetic workload generator is used to provide
an easily controllable workload that will aid fault
propagation. Since fault propagation and the even-
tual effect of faults are dependent upon the accompa-
nying workload, the ability to control the workload
is essential to influencing fault propagation. With
the synthetic workload generator, the workload can
be specified to exercise the CPU, memory, or disk.
The amount of stress that the workload places on
each system component (i.e., CPU, memory, or disk)
can be given as a distribution over time. Multiple
workload processes can be executed.
Stress-based injection is the process of injecting
faults based upon a measurement of the current
workload activity. Stress in this sense refers to the
amount of activity caused by the workload which
could encourage fault propagation. The workload
is measured and characterized in terms of the level
of stress for each system component and the over-
all system at a particular time. The rate of fault
injection is increased during times of greater overall
system stress, and faults are injected into the system
components with the highest stress level.
Since the main goal of the tool is to characterize
the fault tolerance of the system using a single quan-
tity, a metric for that characterization is needed.
Several-metrics are proposed and measured. The
ratio of detected errors to injected faults represents
the effectiveness of error recovery, while performance
degradation represents the efficiency of error recov-
ery.
In addition to obtaining a measure of the system
fault tolerance, FTAPE is also useful for providing
more detailed feedback to system designers. When
system failures occur, the propagation of the guilty
fault can be traced, and that information can be
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usedto improvethedesignofthefaultcontainment
mechanisms.
FTAPEis designedto beusedona functioning
hardwareimplementationof a fault-tolerantcom-
puter.ThetoolhasbeenimplementedonaTandem
Integrity$2 fault-tolerantcomputer.Experiments
usingthetoolshowtheeffectof differentworkloads
in influencingfaultpropagation.A measureof the
overallsystemfault toleranceis alsoobtained.The
implementationof FTAPEhasbeendesignedto be
portable,althoughthe fault injectoris dependent
to a degreeuponthearchitectureof themeasured
machine.Plansexisttoport thetoolto otherfault-
tolerantmachinesandcomparethefault tolerance
ofthosemachines.
2 Related Work
There are several different approaches to fault injec-
tion. Presently, FTAPE uses software-implemented
fault injection (SWIFI) 1 , which uses software to em-
ulate the effects of underlying physical faults. Sev-
eral fault injection tools use SWIFI, such as FIAT 5,
FERRARI 3, and FINE 4. FTAPE differs from these
tools by adding a synthetic workload generator and
the ability of the fault injector to inject faults based
upon dynamic workload measurements.
Part of the dynamic workload measurement is per-
formed using a hybrid monitor-based environment
similar to that described by Young 7.
3 Description of Tool
FTAPE is a tool that integrates the injection of
faults and the workload necessary to propagate those
faults. The tool is composed of three main parts: FI
(the fault injector), MEASURE, and WG (the work-
load generator). Figure 1 shows how these three
parts interact. The FI is responsible for performing
the fault injection. MEASURE provides a measure-
ment of the current workload activity that is used by
the FI to determine the time and location for fault
injection. The WG is a synthetic workload generator
which creates workloads that are designed to propa-
gate the injected faults. A more detailed description
of each part of the tool follows.
3.1 Fault Injector
The main task of the FI is to inject faults into the
target system. The method of injection used by the
current version of FTAPE is software-implemented
fault injection, which uses software to emulate the
Workload
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Figure 1: General Block Diagram of FTAPE
effects of underlying physical faults. For instance,
a bit in a memory location can be flipped to em-
ulate the effect of an alpha particle on a memory
bit. This method of fault injection is more control-
lable than hardware-based injection (e.g., it would
be difficult to inject faults into memory using hard-
ware), but software-based injection incurs a higher
time overhead. See Section 4.5 for measurements of
this overhead.
The main goal of fault injection is to exercise the
error detection and recovery mechanisms in the tar-
get system: The best way to do this is to inject faults
throughout the entire system. FTAPE partitions the
system into three main areas: cpu, mere, and io.
For each area a different method of fault injection is
required. These areas are also the same areas that
are targeted by the WG. Because the same areas
are targeted by both the FI and the WG, there is a
good chance for the injected faults to be propagated
by the workload.
3.1.1 Fault Injection Method
The fault injection methods used by the FI are de-
scribed below. Note that fault-tolerant systems have
widely varying architectures and therefore require
different fault injection techniques. The following
are for the implementation of FTAPE on the Tan-
dem Integrity $2:
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inject_cpu Faults are injected into CPU registers,
specifically, saved t general purpose and floating
point registers, the program counter, the global
pointer, and stack pointer. These registers were
chosen because faults in these register have a
higher chance of propagation compared to faults
in other registers (e.g., temporary registers).
The method of injection involves the following
steps:
1. Obtain a copy of the registers.
2. Corrupt the register to be injected.
3. Place the corrupted register value back
into the CPU register. The transfer of the
CPU values in and out is only performed
when the targeted workload process is con-
text switched out of the CPU.
The fault model is a single bit-flip.
inject_mem Faults are injected into local memory.
Since only portions of the memory are heav-
ily used by the workload, faults are targeted at
those portions. Faults are injected by directly
modifying the contents of selected memory lo-
cations. The fault model is a single bit-flip.
inject_io Faults are injected into a mirrored disk
system. The method of injection involves using
a test portion of the disk driver code that sets
error flags for the next driver request. Thus,
the next request will be detected by the error
handler in the driver code, and one half of the
disk mirror may be disabled. The fault model
includes valid disk error codes.
3.1.2 Fault Selection Method
The time and location for each fault injection is de-
termined using one of the following methods. Some
of the methods involve the measurement of workload
stress, which is described in the next section:
location-based stress-based injection (LSBI)
Faults are injected into the area (CPU, memory,
or IO) with the greatest normalized stress.
time-based stress-based injection (TSBI)
Faults are injected during the time the compos-
ite stress is greater than a specific threshold.
randomly The fault time is selected randomly
based on a specified distribution (e.g., an expo-
nential interarrival distribution with a specified
tSaved registers are those registers who values must be
preservedacrossprocedurecalls.
mean of 20 seconds), and the fault location is
randomly chosen based on a uniform distribu-
tion.
If an error is detected, then all injections are sus-
pended until the error is corrected, because an error
detection on the Tandem $2 disables the component
in which the error was detected (e.g., a detected er-
ror in the CPU forces the entire CPU off-line).
The fault, models used for cpu and mem are sin-
gle bit-flips. For io, valid error codes are randomly
chosen.
3.2 Workload Generator
The main purpose of the workload generator is to
provide an easily controllable workload that can
propagate the faults injected by the FI. The work-
load is synthetic to allow easy specification of the
workload, based on a few parameters. The same ar-
eas that are used used the FI (cpu, mem, and io)
are targeted for workload activity. Each workload is
comprised of one or more processes. Each process is
composed of a sequence of the following three func-
tions, each of which exercises one of the three main
system areas intensively:
use_cpu This function is CPU-intensive. It con-
sists of repeated additions, subtractions, multi-
plications, and divisions for integer and float-
ing point variables. These operations are
performed in a loop containing conditional
branches. Memory accesses are limited by using
CPU registers as much as possible.
use_mere This function is memory-intensive. A
large memory array is created, and locations in
this array are repeatedly read from and writ-
ten to in a sequential manner. The array is
larger than the size of the data cache in order
to ensure that accesses are being made to the
physical memory.
use_io This function is I/O-intensive. A dummy
file system is created on a mirrored disk system.
Opens, reads, writes, and closes are repeatedly
performed.
The parameters for each function are specified in
a parameter file. In practice, each function is usu-
ally specified to last the same amount of time (e.g.,
one second). Then the composition of each work-
load process can be specified to contain a specific
proportion of each function. For instance, a work-
load that is CPU-intensive with a small amount of
memory and I/O activity can be specified to contain
3
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90%ofthecpu functionand5%ofthemereandio
functions.Suchaworkloadwouldbesaidto havea
composition of 90/5/5. When the workload process
is executed, each function will be randomly chosen
according to corresponding probabilities.
Each function also reads and writes data from
a special global interdependence array which forces
data flow among functions. This is necessary to en-
courage fault propagation among functions. Other-
wise, a data fault in one function is usually overwrit-
ten if the fault influences only variables local to that
function and the system doesn't detect the error be-
fore the end of the function.
The intensity is the amount of activity in each
function relative to the maximum possible activity.
The intensity of each function can be controlled.
This is useful for studying the impact of the work-
load activity level on fault propagation. For most of
the workloads used in the experiments in Section 4,
the intensity is varied from 100% to 20% over a pe-
riod of about nine minutes $. Varying the intensity
emphasizes the effect of high and low workload ac-
tivity on the amount of fault propagation.
Finally, the workload sends to the FI information
needed to determine the location of certain faults,
such which processes are currently executing and
what portions of memory are being used.
3.3 MEASURE
MEASURE is a tool that monitors the actual work-
load activity. Each workload is specified by its as-
sociated parameter files to contain a certain relative
amount of cpu, mere, and io activity. Although
each workload function is designed to be very inten-
sive for one system area, each function must nee-
essarily cause activity in other system areas. For
instance, the io function must also use the CPU and
perform memory reads and writes as well as access-
ing the disk. Thus, the MEASURE tool is necessary
to measure the actual activity caused by the work-
load.
MEASURE returns the level of workload stress
for each system area as well as for the system as a
whole. The stress is the amount of workload activity
-- especially that which can aid fault propagation.
As with the FI, the methods needed to obtain the
stress measures for each system area are system de-
pendent to a large extent. For each system area, the
following methods are used to obtain the workload
stress:
SThis time period needs to be long enough for the MEA-
SURE tool and FI to react to the corresponding workload
activity.
measure_cpu The stress measure is based upon the
CPU utilization. On the $2, the sat utility re-
turns the CPU utilization.
measure_mere The stress measure is based upon
the number of reads and writes per second to
the memory space used by the workload. Since
any software method of obtaining this informa-
tion would incur an unacceptable amount of
overhead, a hardware method is used. A Tek-
tronix DAS 9200 logic analyzer is used to count
the number of memory accesses. This count is
automatically sent to the MEASURE program
every 10 seconds.
measure_.io The stress measure is based on the
number of disk blocks accessed per second. On
the $2, the sat utility returns the number of
disk blocks accessed per second.
A detailed description of the setup needed to mea-
sure mere stress can be found in Young 6.
Each stress measure is normalized in order to
compare the different measures. The normaliza-
tion is performed by running a set of various
workloads § and obtaining a distribution of the raw
stress measures (i.e., CPU utilization, memory ac-
cesses/second, and disk blocks/second). Each raw
stress measure was normalized to a value between 0
and 1, inclusively, based on the following formula,
where Xmi, is the 5th percentile value and )(max is
the 95th percentile value in the raw stress distribu-
tion:
One disadvantiage of the current methods is the
relatively long amount of time between measure-
ments (about 10 seconds). This is mainly due to
the amount of time required by the logic analyzer to
count memory accesses. However, most of this time
is used to set up the logic analyzer; the actual count
only takes about one second. A newer logic analyzer
will be used in the future to significantly decrease
this setup time.
4 Experiments
The main goals of the following experiments are
• to see how FTAPE can be used to investigate
how a specific machine (the Tandem Integrity
$2) performs under faults and
1
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• to illustratetheeffectivenessofstress-basedin-
jection.
ThetargetmachinefortheseexperimentsistheTan-
demIntegrity$2 fault-tolerantcomputer.A brief
descriptionof the $2 is givenin Section4.1. The
generalexperimentalprocedureisdescribedin Sec-
tion 4.2. The first setof experiments,described
in Section4.3,involvesinjectingcoordinatedfaults
(i.e.,faults that areinjectedinto areasof great-
estworkloadstress)anduncoordinatedfaults(i.e.,
faultsthat areinjectedintoareasofleastworkload
stress).Theseexperimentsexposethesensitivityof
certainworkloadsto specificfaults. Thenextset
of experiments,presentedin Section4.4,illustrates
theeffectivenessofstress-basedinjectionsinincreas-
ing faultpropagation.Finally,theoverheadof the
FI andMEASUREtoolsis measuredandgivenin
Section4.5.
4.1 Description of $2
The Integrity $2 2 is a fault-tolerant computer de-
signed by Tandem Computers, Inc. The core of the
$2 is its triple-modular-redundant processors. Each
processor includes a CPU, a cache, and an 8MB local
memory. Although these three processors perform
the same work, they operate independently of each
other until they need to access the doubly-replicated
global memory. At this point, the duplexed Triple
Modular Redundant Controllers (TMRCs) vote on
the address and data. If an error is found, the faulty
processor is shut down. After that processor passes
a power-on self-test (POST), it is reintegrated into
the system by copying the states of the two good
processors. Voting also occurs on all I/O and in-
terrupts. In addition, the local memory is scrubbed
periodically. This architecture ensures that a fault
that occurs on one processor will not propagate to
other system components without being caught by
the TMRC voting process.
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Figure 2: Overview of Tandem Integrity $2 Archi-
tecture
4.2 General Experimental Procedure
Each experiment thus is composed of two runs, one
with faults and one without. The reason for this du-
plication is that is allows the calculation of the per-
formance degradation, which is the amount of extra
time required by the workload due to the detection
and correction of faults by the system. If T! is the
workload execution time under fault injection and
Tn! is the time with no faults, then the performance
5
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degradation is
Performance_ TI,
Degradation Tnl - 1.
Performance degradation can be used as a measure
of system fault tolerance because it is related to de-
pendability degradation. When a system is in an
error state, it is vulnerable to system failure if an-
other fault is activated (assuming single fault toler-
ance), and thus the dependability of the system is
degraded. Dependability degradation is difficult to
measure directly. The performance degradation due
to faults is easily measured.
Each experiment consists of the following steps:
1. Start the MEASURE tool.
2. Run the workload while injecting faults. Mea-
sure the total workload time required.
3. Run the workload a second time, this time with-
out injecting any faults. Again measure the to-
tal workload time required.
For the second non-injection run, the FI is still exe-
cuted, but with null injection masks. In other words,
the FI goes through the motions of injecting faults,
but instead of flipping a bit (XORing with a 1) and
setting a disk error (setting error to nonzero value),
the FI doesn't flip a bit (XORs with a 0) and sets
a null disk error (sets error to zero value). By so
doing, the second run will also invoke the same FI
overhead as the first run. This is important when
comparing workload execution times.
To illustrate the relationship between dependabil_
ity degradation and performance degradation, con-
sider, for example, the mirrored disk system. When
an error is detected on one of the mirrored disks, the
mirror half is taken off-line. This results in lower de-
pendability because an' error in the remaining mir-
ror half will take down the entire disk system (which
would result in a total system failure if it contains
vital files). When the bad mirror half is off-line, all
disk reads must be serviced by the single on-line mir-
ror half. This results in lower degraded performance
compared to a disk mirror with two on-line halves,
which can send half of the disk reads to each mirror
half.
Another result that is interesting is the ratio of
error detections to fault inj.ections. Along with the
performance degradation the errors/fault ratio show
the amount of fault propagation for each experiment.
4.3 Sensitivity of Workloads to Faults
The experiments in this section show that faults
which are injected into the areas of greatest work-
load stress produce the most fault propagation. The
experiments are grouped into two categories: (1) in-
ject faults into areas with little workload stress and
(2) inject faults into areas with the greatest work-
load stress. For example, the experiments in the first
two rows of Table 1 involve cpu injections. The first
experiment uses a cpu-intensive workload, while the
second other uses a mostly mere and io workload.
The injection time is chosen randomly based on an
exponential rate with a specified mean of 20 seconds.
The results of the experiments are given in Ta-
ble 1. Each row represents the average of multiple
runs. From Table 1, a few observations can be made.
First, the amount of fault propagation (as seen in the
errors/fault and performance degradation colunms)
is higher if faults are exercised by heavy workload
activity in that area (as shown in the composition
column). This is especially evident for io, where
the rate of error detection doubles from 0.295 to
0.650, and the performance degradation increases
from 0.0703 to 1.1296, when an io-intensive work-
load is used. This effect occurs because the injected
io faults are being activated more by the increased
io workload activity. The reason the io fault propa-
gation increase is more pronounced than for cpu or
mere is the different type of effect a downed mir-
ror half has compared to a downed CPU or memory.
The downed mirror half causes all disk reads to go
to the single mirror half, thus almost halving the
disk access rate (if disk writes are ignored) until the
mirror half is repaired and brought on-line (which
takes about 100 seconds). The down CPU or mem-
ory only impacts the performance when the CPU or
memory must be halted for repair (i.e., copying the
data from the good CPU or memory), which requires
only one or two seconds. These results verify that
fault propagation is affected by the workload.
4.4 Stress-based Injection Results
The experiments in this section use time-based
(TSBI) and location-based (LSBI) stress-based in-
jection to determine the time and location for fault
injection. The results of these experiments are given
in Table 2. Each line in the table represents the av-
erage of multiple runs. Four different workloads are
injected with faults in the following manner:
1. Faults are injected only if the composite work-
load stress is higher then the high stress thresh-
old. (Noted as "High" TSBI in the table.)
2. Faults are injected only if the composite work-
load stress is lower than the low stress threshold.
(Noted as "Low" TSBI in the table.)
6
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Injection
Run Location
a cpu
b cpu
c mern
d mere
e |o
f io
Table 1: Sensitivity of Workloads to Faults
Errors
Composition Faults Errors
cpu mem io Injected Detected
4 48 48 61 9 0.148
90 5 5 101 26 0.257
48 4 48 87.3 2.3 0.027
5 90 5 70.7 2.7 0.038
48 48 4 48.3 12 0.248
5 5 90 36.7 25.7 0.700
Time with Time without Performance
Faults (sec) Faults (sec) Degradation
1588 1544 0.0285
2334 2236 0.0438
1948 1928 0.0104
1558 1537 0.0137
2026 1910 0.0607
3347 1583 1.1143
Table 2: Stress-based Injection Results
Errors
Composition Faults Errors
Run TSBI cpu mem io Injected Detected
g High 90 5 5 24 4 0.177
Low 90 5 5 170 12 0.073
h High 20 20 60 73 14 0.197
Low 20 20 60 75 2 0.027
i High 5 5 90 38 30 0.788
Low 5 5 90 55 2 0.032
j High 33 33 33 68 8 0.118
Low 33 33 33 96 4 0.045
Time with Time without Performance
Faults (sec) Faults (sec) Degradation
2362 2299 0.0273
2375 2301 0.0322
2335 1713 0.3632
1755 1712 0.0251
3573 1589 1.248
1593 1586 0.0046
1959 1861 0.0524
1875 1856 0.0102
It can be seen that the fault propagation (as seen
in the errors/fault and performance degradation
columns) is lower in all cases when faults are injected
during times of low workload activity. As was the
case with the experiments in the previous section,
the io-intensive workload (with 5/5/90 composition)
has the most significant difference in fault propaga-
tion.
4.5 Overhead
There is an overhead associated with the FI and
MEASURE tools. Each requires CPU time, which
increases the workload execution time. Also, addi-
tional effects such as cache flushing, paging, and I/O
activity can further increase the workload execution
time. The impact of this overhead on the workload
execution time can be measured by comparing the
time the workload requires with and without the FI
and MEASURE tools executing simultaneously. The
results are given in Table 3. Although the overhead
caused by the FI and MEASURE programs is sig-
nificant (5.4-16.8%), this overhead is incurred for all
experiments. For the two runs in each type of exper-
iment, the run with faults and the run without faults
requires the FI and MEASURE programs to perform
the same operations. Thus, although the overhead
affects the absolute results, the relative results are
much less affected by the overhead. Further study is
needed to determine if the impact can be completely
ignored.
The overhead also seems to increase with more
CPU activity and less I/O activity. This might occur
because less idle CPU cycles are available for the FI
and Measure programs as the workload blocks less
for I/O and uses the CPU more.
5 Conclusions
FTAPE is a tool that can compare the fault toler-
ance of fault-tolerant computers. Faults are injected
injected at times and locations of greatest workload
activity in order to encourage fault propagation. Ex-
periments with FTAPE show an increase in fault
propagation (as measured by errors/fault and per-
formance degradation) when faults are injected (1)
into components (e.g., CPU) that are exercised heav-
ily by the workload and (2) at times of greatest over-
all workload stress.
In the future, the tool will be ported to other
fault-tolerant platforms and used to compare these
machines. More representative workloads and fault
models will be incorporated into the tool.
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